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Medical humanities and the place of wonder 
H M Evans 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This chapter advocates openness to a sense of wonder at embodied human nature 
as contributing to ‘critical medical humanities.’ It is argued that many aspects of 
critical medical humanities are continuous with – hence already found in – 
mainstream medical humanities, and are not necessarily a distinct development 
now. Nonetheless the chapter affirms that the critical eye of ‘critical medical 
humanities’ is legitimately turned upon, inter alia, shortcomings in ‘mainstream’ 
conventional medical humanities hitherto. One such shortcoming is the traditional 
assumption that the conceptual challenge in thinking about clinical medicine and 
healthcare concerns the neglect of the patient’s voice – the materiality of the 
patient’s body being somehow un-problematically self-evident. This assumption 
needs to be challenged by a confrontation with the mystery of our embodiment, and 
the chapter argues that an openness to wonder is a crucial element in that 
challenge. Acknowledging the inescapably dualist character of self-conscious 
wondering reflection on our materiality, the chapter brings a conception of wonder 
to bear upon our bodies as vibrant matter – objects that are special in large part 
because they share the specialness of matter as such. This reversal of a traditional 
medical humanities critique gives wonder a particular role in critical medical 
humanities. 
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Introduction 
 
It will be the argument of this chapter that, among the critiques that could be 
thought to contribute to ‘critical medical humanities,’ at least one may turn out to 
bear upon an important – but generally tacit – presumption in mainstream medical 
humanities. The presumption in question is that, taking our materiality and 
embodiment for granted, medical humanities’ principal task is to return the patient’s 
voice to prominence within the clinical encounter. The particular critique I have in 
mind involves disputing this very taken-for-granted-ness of our embodiment, and 
cautioning against replacing medicine’s neglect of the personal with medical 
humanities’ neglect of the material. 
Medical humanities is still ‘under development’ in terms of its scope, methods, 
presumptive goals and scholarly security. Returning the patient’s voice – due 
attention to her or his experiences, hopes, fears, interests and will – to a central 
place in the clinical encounter remains a key concern of much legitimate work within 
mainstream medical humanities. But in undertaking it, we should avoid or curb 
simplistic forms of opposition to medical materialism, bio-reductionism or 
mechanistic views of health and illness. The point is not that those views ought not 
to be opposed, just that they should not be opposed simplistically. An emphasis on 
the patient’s story, the biographical narrative, ought to take seriously also her being 
a material object – her thing-hood – lest the narrative emphasis inadvertently 
compound that ‘disenchantment’1 of the material body that, we often suppose, is 
wrought by the scientific gaze. Our bodies-as-objects sustain an experience proper 
to material things that know themselves from the inside, have agency, and have a 
finite duration. These characteristics defy ordinary understanding, are essential to 
our nature, and are at risk of wholesale neglect by simplistic opposition to 
biomedical reductionism. 
Although this critique can be stated in dry analytic terms – as I have here – the 
source of its motivation, its ‘energetics’ (to use Bennett’s term2) need not be. In my 
own case, this ‘energetics’ arises in a sense of wonder at embodied human nature. 
And since turning critique upon mainstream medical humanities should be among 
the additional virtues of a ‘critical medical humanities,’ then my claim will be that 
critical medical humanities may be done valuable service by a well-attuned and 
wide-awake sense of wonder.  
 
Critique, ‘the critical’ and critical medical humanities 
 
First let us review the ideas of critique and ‘the critical’ in relation to the critical 
medical humanities. There are perhaps four pertinent senses of ‘critical’ in this 
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context. First, something may be critical in the sense of dispassionately and 
rationally analytic, as when one undertakes a critical appraisal of a work or an idea. 
Typical of this within a humanities discipline is David Raphael’s oft-cited 
characterisation of analytic philosophy as being ‘the critical evaluation of 
assumptions and arguments.’3 Second, and perhaps most commonly-encountered in 
daily life, someone is typically described as being critical of something if he or she is 
negatively disposed towards it, aversive or hostile (we often speak of ‘being critical 
of’ a suggestion or a proposal). Third, something may be vitally necessary – for 
instance, correct tyre pressures are critical to the safe and predictable behaviour of a 
car on the road. And fourth, a pivotal or future-shaping moment or phase may be 
thought to be ‘the critical point’ as when the capture of a key stronghold is seen to 
be the turning point in a battle. 
Now how does critical medical humanities fare under these different senses of 
‘critical’? It should, I think, always be dispassionately and rationally analytic, at any 
rate when undertaken in an academic spirit. It may well often be contingently 
negative, as when it is undertaken to bring about change – medical humanities is 
after all the continuation of medical ethics’ response to the perceived shortcomings 
of excessively managerial and technical conceptions of healthcare. Naturally this 
Volume entertains the ambition that critical medical humanities be vitally necessary 
to the continued and extended relevance of medical humanities in understanding 
and developing organised healthcare. Whether its present turn – of which this 
Volume is an expression – will be seen to be pivotal is of course something that can 
be judged only retrospectively by future scholars. We shall simply have to wait and 
hope. 
Be that as it may, critical medical humanities is inevitably a critique – a further 
idea that may itself fulfil the four senses, above, of ‘critical.’ Any considered critique 
is (or ought to be) dispassionately and rationally analytic, and individual cases will 
frequently, though not inevitably, reflect an at least negative or sceptical view of 
their object. As a general phenomenon (I do not here speak of individual critiques) 
the very idea of critique is essential to the testing of thought and hence to its 
development or elaboration; it is in this sense critical to almost any kind of progress. 
From time to time, given this general role, individual critiques will be seen to be 
pivotal. (Some examples even go by the very name – Immanuel Kant’s Critique of 
Pure Reason is the first and most blazing to come to mind, in its altering forever the 
possibilities available to western thought when considering the relationship between 
mind and world.4) 
 
Progressive critique within mainstream medical humanities 
 
I should say at the outset that while critical medical humanities is self-evidently 
named as a sub-set of a wider mainstream medical humanities, I do not myself see it 
as necessarily a late or current epoch but rather as an emergent tendency that is 
always immanent within (at the very least) philosophical forms of medical 
humanities enquiry, perhaps becoming more recently apparent as it accumulates, 
but there all along. 
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Patterns of its emergence can be found, I think, that vary with the interests of the 
enquirer. But most observers would recognise the view, put forward by Angela 
Woods and Anne Whitehead,5 that the broad field of medical humanities has roots 
in ethics, education and experience, and most would agree with them – I certainly 
would – that it is the last of these that has typically received central attention from 
medical humanities researchers, focusing on the experience of illness, diagnosis and 
treatment. 
Woods and Whitehead identify a ‘primal scene’ for ‘mainstream’ medical 
humanities, subsisting within the clinical encounter and typically involving ‘the 
moment when a doctor gives the diagnosis of cancer to a patient’ – a moment that 
gives rise to trenchant and characteristic questions concerning experience, 
engagement and response, and human frailty. As they rightly observe, these are the 
questions that have received most attention in conventional medical humanities.6 
For Woods and Whitehead ‘the critical medical humanities’ offer a two-fold 
advance on the mainstream, in method and in agenda. The gain in method consists 
in the attempt to ‘pose more critical questions’ to this ‘primal’ scene, taking greater 
account of societal and political context and factors and of how the ideas pertinent 
to health, illness and disability are used in public spheres; Woods and Whitehead 
thereby question the adequacy of medical humanities scholarship hitherto.7 The 
enlarged agenda consists in a reflexive turn whereby medical concepts are taken up 
and interrogated within the ‘theorisations and operations’ of humanities and social 
sciences themselves.8 
Pace Woods and Whitehead, I would myself regard many aspects of these 
important advances as having been long implicit in what I would call a progressive 
critique that is visible in the mainstream of medical humanities and is indeed in some 
respects traceable back to forebears in medical ethics and in philosophy and 
sociology of medicine, as I shall summarise below. Similarly, when they survey the 
range of pertinent senses of ‘critical,’ there is much to agree with – but not, 
however, because it is newly arrived-at, but rather because it is perhaps a little more 
mainstream than they suggest. For instance, although some mainstream medical 
humanities writers may have been guilty of upholding a supporting role for 
humanities in the service of medicine, a progressive critique has explicitly contrasted 
this with an alternative, and preferable, integrated role for the humanities in 
response to the perceived neglect of the patient’s experience in technical and 
managerial forms of healthcare delivery.9 Again, humanities have been seen as 
critical in the sense of being vital to medicine since long before medical humanities 
emerged as a discrete field of study, among writers as diverse as William Osler,10 
René Dubos11 and more recently Eric Cassell.12 Moreover while I strongly uphold the 
insistence that critical medical humanities ‘sets research agendas reciprocally in the 
humanities,’13 it is not new: I myself have been proposing it over many years,14 15 16 
partly inspired by Stephen Toulmin’s earlier example;17 signally, such an insistence is 
fundamental to the conception of the project ‘Medicine and Human Flourishing’ for 
which the Durham Centre for Medical Humanities was awarded a Wellcome Trust 
Strategic Award in Medical Humanities in 2008. 
The ‘progressive critique’ that I have in mind has its own history. For some 
decades, commentators in both medical ethics and, subsequently, medical 
humanities have recognised and protested the fragility of the patient’s voice, story 
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and experience in clinical encounters that were conceived within the biomechanical 
form of the medical model. Thus a standard medical humanities critique sought to 
affirm or re-affirm the patient’s voice within the clinical encounter. For example, the 
standard critique is implicit or explicit in work by Susan Stephenson and Gillian 
Walker,18 Jack Coulehan,19 Eric Cassell,20 Trisha Greenhalgh,21 Trisha Greenhalgh and 
Brian Hurwitz,22 Raimo Puustinen,23 Jeremy Holmes,24 Rita Charon,25 Alex Mauron 
and Micheline Louis-Courvoisier,26 Sven Frederiksen27 and Cecil Helman.28 
What I think these instances of the standard critique have in common is that they 
presume or openly acknowledge the materiality of the patient’s body as being self-
evidently crucial, while somehow not being ‘the problem.’ The challenge and the 
mystery lie elsewhere, in successfully integrating the person into the clinician’s 
conception of the patient, and thus the patient’s voice into the clinical encounter. 
Cassell at times exemplifies this:  
 
The job of the twenty-first century is the discovery of the person – finding the 
sources of illness and suffering within the person, and with that knowledge 
developing methods for their relief, while at the same time revealing the 
power within the person as the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have 
revealed the power of the body.29 EXT 
 
Physicians’ manifest knowledge of disease has been the focus of medicine for 
these last 150 years while knowledge of sick persons and doctors has 
languished – left to intuition and unfocussed experience.30 
 
….as does Charon: 
 
Sick people need physicians who can understand their diseases, treat their 
medical problems, and accompany them through their illnesses. Despite 
medicine's recent dazzling technological progress in diagnosing and treating 
illnesses, physicians sometimes lack the capacities to recognize the plights of 
their patients, to extend empathy toward those who suffer, and to join 
honestly and courageously with patients in their illnesses.31 EXT 
 
She, like Greenhalgh and Hurwitz, is an exponent of alternative ‘narrative-based’ 
conceptions of medical practice largely in response to bureaucratic and commodified 
forms of medical care. 
Others however extended the conventional critique to acknowledge that clinical 
medicine needed a more sophisticated understanding of the body itself, and not 
simply as it were a re-attachment to it of the person. Fritjof Capra for instance takes 
the biomedical model as his target for a critique within the medical arena that 
nonetheless exemplifies what can go wrong with the inappropriate application of 
mechanistic thought: 
 
By concentrating on smaller and smaller fragments of the body, modern 
medicine often loses sight of the patient as a human being, and by reducing 
health to mechanical functioning, it is no longer able to deal with the 
phenomenon of healing. This is perhaps the most serious shortcoming of the 
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biomedical approach, Although every practicing physician knows that healing 
is an essential aspect of all medicine, the phenomenon is considered outside 
the scientific framework; the term ‘healer’ is viewed with suspicion, and the 
concepts of health and healing are generally not discussed in medical 
schools.32 EXT 
 
Similar challenges to the way we see and understand our own materiality underlie 
the work of David Morris,33 Byron Good34 and Stephen Toulmin35 for example. When 
these challenges are taken up within work that is more obviously badged as medical 
humanities, I think that the result is plausibly to be found as prototypical or already 
constitutive of ‘critical’ medical humanities in the area that interests me for our 
purposes in this chapter – a recognition that ‘the problem’ lies not solely in 
understanding (and responding to) the experience of the patient but also in 
understanding how that experience is fused with the materiality of the body, and 
hence in better understanding the meaning of what it is to be human in the intense 
context of the clinical encounter. Greaves asserts the scale of the challenge: 
 
…the most notable feature of Western medicine … is not mechanistic medical 
monism, but lopsided medical dualism, with the technical and the sciences 
dominant, and the personal and the arts recessive, but without any complete 
supremacy.36 
 
He subsequently argues that the biomedical model cannot adequately be redressed; 
it must instead be replaced with a radical ‘new medical cosmology.37 
This takes seriously Toulmin’s challenge as do, in their different ways, medical 
humanities writers as diverse as Marjorie Sirridge and Kathleen Welch,38 Steve 
Wainwright and Bryan Turner,39 and Carl-Edvard Rudebeck40 to give but a few 
examples. I think each of these constitutes emergent ‘critical medical humanities’ in 
one or more of the senses that I have noted above. 
The importance of this is, for me, increasingly tied to a kind of inversion of where 
I think medical humanities (and medical ethics before it) set out. Instead of taking 
our materiality for granted in search of the interpersonal and experiential within the 
clinical encounter, I am more inclined to take for granted at least the fact of the 
interpersonal in the search for a fuller confrontation with our own materiality. If, 
given their success in restoring the patient’s voice, the conventional medical 
humanities critiques have neglected her materiality then I take it as one among the 
many tasks of a more critical medical humanities to protest this neglect and to try 
and reverse it. To do anything like justice to the task requires, I suggest, a 
confrontation with our embodiment that does justice to its mystery. That 
confrontation, my personal adventure in critical medical humanities, is constituted in 
the sense and experience of wonder at embodied human nature. 
 
What is this thing called wonder? – a prefatory note 
 
If exploring wonder has a role in the ‘business’ of doing medical humanities, then in 
this chapter I will try to discern at least one aspect of that role. To attempt it, then I 
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first need to say what I mean by wonder. Here is a provisional definition that I have 
previously put forward in the context of the clinical encounter: 
 
Wonder characterises a special kind of transfiguring encounter between us 
and something other than us: it is an attitude of special attentiveness that 
arises within us, prompted by circumstances that may be entirely ordinary 
yet, through our active and responsive imagination, can yield an object in 
which the ordinary is transfigured by and suffused with something 
extraordinary as well. The attitude of wonder is thus one of altered, 
compellingly-intensified attention to something that we immediately 
acknowledge as somehow important – something that might be unexpected, 
that in its fullest sense we certainly do not yet understand, and towards 
which we will likely want to turn our faculty of understanding; something 
whose initial appearance to us engages our imagination before our 
understanding; something at that moment larger and more significant than 
ourselves; something in the face of which we momentarily set aside our own 
concerns (and even our self-conscious awareness, in the most powerful 
instances).41 EXT 
 
This is admittedly a rather ponderous attempt – and there is a much shorter way of 
putting the matter that, I think, implies the foregoing and catches something of the 
poetry of experiences of wonder: in wonder the world is made newly-present to us. 
Now wonder is not unique in this general regard, of course. I see wonder as one 
of the varieties of intensified experience among others – mystical, religious, ecstatic, 
aesthetic, sublime; or an experience of overpowering love, or of unusual moral 
clarity. Within all of these kinds of cases there is no doubt something that we can 
encourage, and perhaps cultivate. What may be true of all of them, but is usually 
true of experiences of wonder, is that we cannot summon them up on demand, like 
rubbing a lamp to produce a genie. Another characteristic of wonder is shared by 
some, but definitely not all, of the other varieties of intensified experience: 
experiences of wonder are typically valuable and it would be appropriate to 
encourage them and seek them out, but wonder is also certainly capable of a double 
edge. Just like the aesthetic imagination, it may sharpen what we already are, for 
good or ill. It is one thing to see, intensely, the future of the world in a new-born 
child; but perhaps not only in fiction (Hans Castorp is the modern prototype here in 
Thomas Mann’s The Magic Mountain) does a damaged imagination find wonder in 
necrosis and death.42 
So the sense of a world made newly-present is not the sole property of the 
morally upright, or the aesthetically-mature, any more than is the experience of 
religious or mystical ecstasy. With intense experience comes, perhaps, intense 
responsibility. Along with these, wonder is liable to lead to an alteration in our 
apprehending the world, an alteration that clearly bears on how we derive our 
conception of ‘the good.’ It may intensify what we are inclined to see as good and it 
may give us a fresh conception of why good things are good. For instance, there is a 
deal of difference between those who see in the natural world a panoply of reasons 
to be humble about who we are and what we can do, and those who see in that 
same natural world a dazzling array of opportunities for commercial gain. 
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The philosophical exploration of wonder is an enduring challenge even if one 
confines oneself to those aspects most obviously provoked by the concerns of 
medical humanities, since one of wonder’s chief provocations is also the core 
business of healthcare and any ensuing medical humanities worth the name, that is 
embodied human experience in sickness and in health. I have scratched the surface 
with enquiries into wonder in relation to the clinician, to the patient, and to human 
finitude and mortality;43 44 such enquiries presume the connection of different 
people’s imaginations through wonder, and our engagement with the lives of others 
through shared wondering experiences. These and other enquiries engage the 
question of wonder’s phenomenological content; its characteristic dynamics (for 
instance, in relation to normally-perceived time); the question of whether it can be 
cultivated; whether there is such a thing as a ‘talent’ for wonder; whether wonder is 
in any sense gendered; whether it can be silenced, defeated or annulled; and 
whether it can coexist meaningfully with explanation. And so on. All of these 
distinguishable enquiries, I believe, are capable of contributing to medical 
humanities enquiry as well as furthering the understanding of wonder in its own 
right. 
 
Turning the tables: a reverse ‘critical-medical-humanities’ 
critique 
 
If our bodies’ materiality is important, and particularly if it is important in ways 
beyond those that are the obvious focus of that mechanistic form of medicine 
against which medical humanities conventionally protests, then obscuring that 
importance may at best be misleading, and at worst risk a harmful distortion in the 
way we conceive the goals of clinical care. We should avoid such a risk, initially by 
pointing out the error of ignoring our bodies’ materiality, in a reflexive critique 
proper to the critical medical humanities. If pointing out and, ideally, demonstrating 
the importance of our bodies’ materiality helps us avoid obscuring it, then that 
would be both a morally and an epistemically good thing, on the story so far. So 
balancing a conventional and traditional medical humanities critique with this 
reverse critique would be an important constraint upon – or, perhaps, a more 
sophisticated version of – the conventional medical humanities view. Accordingly, in 
this chapter I put forward this reverse critique as a candidate instance of critical 
medical humanities in action, in this instance turned reflexively upon one of 
conventional medical humanities’ chief concerns. 
Now to take this reverse critique forward one must establish its own grounding 
assumption, that our materiality, our ‘thing-ness,’ is important in other ways than as 
the contested or reductive objects of the biomedical gaze. Accordingly I will try to 
take for granted neither experience nor materiality, neither passion nor clay – and 
nor will I take for granted their wondrous fusion together in us now as we live, nor 
their apparent (and equally wondrous) dissolution when we die. (Nor, at the risk of a 
whiff of pan-psychism, would I willingly rule out even their apparent latency in the 
physical world around us, although my argument does not depend on this.) For I fear 
that even while objecting to an ostensibly-depersonalised view of the patient one 
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may risk taking too impoverished a view of objects or material things in general – 
which, of course, include our own material selves. 
 
A whiff of dualism? 
 
There’s an unavoidable caveat at this point, in that we must acknowledge the risk of 
expressing the reverse critique in somewhat dualist terms. The conventional medical 
humanities critique generally assumes that the biomedical view, allegedly so 
negligent of the personhood of the patient, arises from a crude mechanistic dualism 
blamed (rather unfairly, I think) on René Descartes, whose attractions for medical 
arrivisme are impishly summarised by Roy Porter: ‘A huge KEEP OUT notice had, as it 
were, been pinned to the body, excluding theologians, moralists, and anyone else 
considering fishing in medicine’s pond.’45 
It is this broad attribution of dualism – together with a tacit but more or less 
dogmatic supposition that no form of dualism is tenable – that I think supplies the 
metaphysical underpinnings of the conventional critique, whose primary focus is of 
course ethical. I have clear sympathies with the ethical intent, but anxieties about 
too-simple an adoption of the anti-dualist foundations. 
Essentially, if the critique is objecting to a medical dualism it must itself be free 
from any dualist taint, such as promoting the experiential self at the expense of the 
bodily self, for instance. It’s no good talking about narrative and the making of 
meaning without paying close attention to the bodily grounds of narrative and 
meaning, as Mark Johnson has expounded at length.46 Some defensible alternative 
to dualism must be implicit in the conventional critique, and I think it generally 
behoves the critic to make clear what that alternative is. I myself struggle to know 
how to talk about embodied human experience in wholly non-dualistic terms. When 
Christoph Rehmann-Sutter and Dominik Mahr characterise sufferers of inherited 
disease as facing the problems of ‘living a body’ they disclose the difficulty of 
suppressing a duality joining the life and the body by which the life is lived.47 
I turn for help here to something like aspect-dualism. There may indeed be no 
mental substances of the kind presumed in ‘substance dualism,’ but I do not know 
how to talk about ideas, about mental causation, or about the antecedents of mind 
other than as logically-distinguishable aspects of processes that cannot be described 
in solely-physical terms. Some writers, health geographers prominently among them, 
appear to concede this but try to downplay the significance of the concession – 
perhaps in the hope of avoiding opprobrium – through emphasising the importance 
of the affective over against the rational, and its grounding in embodiment.48 49 In 
particular, ‘non-representational theories’ aim at enfolding external objects of 
experience into shared habits and practices in which meaning, signification, and 
symbols are conceptually subordinated to affective bodily reactions. As has been 
argued elsewhere,50 this reduces rational and intentional engagement with the 
world to mere epiphenomena, grievously undermining an otherwise laudable 
attention to the grounding of our experience in embodiment. But there is more to 
experience than affect – without due regard for cognition and intentionality (in all 
senses, the Husserlian included), we lose all purchase on the content of 
experience.51 
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Still more radically, ardent exponents of anti-dualist theories of mind – Susan 
Blackmore is an example – leave me wondering what their own self-experience can 
really be like, if they genuinely feel that the self is dispensable or illusory, a phantom 
created by philosophising.52 By contrast, after we have acknowledged (as we 
certainly should) the substantial proportion of perception, thought, action and 
response that arise from our combined body-brain’s automatic, embodied, 
instinctual, sub-conscious operations, there is for me (and, I take it, for the reader) 
an irreducible inner, felt, qualitative remainder of mental life – what we call mind, or 
experience, or will, bursting alive in our longings, our purposes, our contemplations, 
our realisations, and so forth – that simply cannot be made intelligible in exclusively 
material descriptions. (Nowhere is this more preternaturally clear to me than in 
considering the content, and the self-abnegating mode, of experiences of wonder; 
but it is clear enough in virtually all other experiences as well.) The crude 
mechanistic dualism alleged of much post-Enlightenment science may well be guilty 
of all the sins attributed to it, but I have never understood why anyone thinks that 
the solution to one entrenched folly lies in adopting a fresh one. 
Nor can a conventional medical humanities critique simply try to ‘dissolve the 
question’ as meaningless (once a favourite Oxford-school response to troublesome 
questions in philosophy). One cannot easily put forward a substantive view on an 
insubstantial question; if the problem of the relation between brain and mind is 
ultimately meaningless, then the anti-dualist critique is just slicing through air, and 
energy would be better deployed elsewhere. Rather it seems to me that we should 
take neither experience nor embodiment for granted. Recognising that the 
conventional critique has in ethical terms a perfectly legitimate target, we might 
better say that an unthinkingly mechanistic biomedical approach errs by neglecting 
the patient’s experience through taking it for granted (or leaving it for others to deal 
with elsewhere – theologians perhaps, in Porter’s waspish caricature). The 
conventional medical humanities riposte to that error must avoid the danger of 
mirroring it, in somehow taking our materiality for granted. 
 
Keeping materiality in mind 
 
There are, then, two conditions here that the standard medical humanities critique 
must meet. First, to complain in general terms about dualistic understandings of the 
patient without providing a satisfactory alternative monistic account will not do. 
That is a task that I do not think has been satisfactorily undertaken (and in the 
meantime I myself am sticking to some kind of modified aspect dualism). Second, 
whether one takes a monist or a dualist view of the patient, the one-dimensionality 
of biomedical materialism will be improved upon only by an alternative view that 
takes for granted neither experience nor embodiment – that manages to do justice 
to both the saturation of experience and the vibrancy of flesh as matter.53 
This problem is of course not the sole responsibility of medical humanities to 
address; indeed the question of how we are to think of matter as such drives (how I 
would have liked to say ‘animates’! But that is to beg the question) the cross-
disciplinary field of ‘thing studies.’ Yet typically ‘thing studies’ addresses questions of 
our identification of and relationships with objects, artefacts, things and their traces, 
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and the signification they have for us (for instance as tokens of loss, remembrance or 
of betrayal, than questions of our actually constituting things ourselves. 
Nearer to the point I have in mind, howsoever difficult it may be found, is the 
work of the French performance artist ORLAN who purports to take the body 
seriously in many aspects of its materiality, such as its plasticity and above all its 
contingency – available for inscription and re-inscription as though it were canvas or 
plaster, or for use as a measuring instrument or even the prototype of a slot-
machine. The enmeshing of our experience among many other kinds of material 
experiences is the concern of David Herman’s work on human-animal relations.54 
Jane Bennett, whose work I mentioned earlier, sees the blending of humans, animals 
and inanimate things as part of the more general dancing vibrancy of matter, in a 
world whose former enchantment she urges us to rediscover. 
Shorn of Bennett’s ethical programme, and shorn of its (apparent) dependence 
on the more bizarre and transgressive enmeshings of bodies and technology, this 
resurgent emphasis on the vibrancy of matter including our bodies’ own matter is 
part of what I think medical humanities requires in its overthrow of traditional 
dualism. (The vibrancy is not separable from the material – one could no more 
contemplate a vibrancy detached from matter than contemplate the smile left over 
from the Cheshire Cat. Yet nor is it wholly-subsumed into the material; it is not, for 
instance, a merely causal property whose impact is independent of the mind and 
imagination of the beholder. Aspect-dualism here again supplies the least-
unsatisfactory account of the phenomenon and what it is for us to notice it.) 
For a wonder-filled exploration of the vibrancy of matter, and of how a kind of 
consolation is possible through understanding that we are built of the very calcium 
that was formed in the stars above our heads, see the extraordinary documentary 
about the Atacama desert, Nostalgia for the Light by the Chilean film-maker Patricio 
Guzmán.55 It is a dizzying thought – literally as well as metaphorically. And if we 
really needed a reminder that, just as bodily events give rise to thoughts (think of 
worrisome conjecture in response to an unexplained symptom) so too thoughts give 
rise to bodily events (think of the erotic imagination, though please defer any 
extended consideration until after finishing this chapter), then the idea of a dizzying 
thought surely supplies it. 
 
Our bodies as objects 
 
And so at length – and here via Chile! – I reach an arena that (for me) irrefragably 
summons our sense of wonder. It’s an arena that I have elsewhere started to sketch 
out56 57 and it comprises aspects of reflection on our nature as embodied 
experiencing beings. 
Our bodies-as-objects sustain experience. It is worth letting this sink in from time 
to time. Faced with our finitude, there are obviously very many who rely on the 
thought of an immortal soul and, in consequence, the hope after death of accessing 
an experience that is independent of a body. So inconceivable is such an experience 
that an alternative hope, adhered to by those who look instead to the resurrection 
of the body in the life to come, seems modest by comparison. But if embodiment is 
necessary for experience, it is not sufficient. So far as we know, inanimate objects do 
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not sustain experience (even if as in the case of some computers we have 
programmed them to mimic its expressions), and we presume that we share the 
phenomena of experience – and a universe accessible in experience – only with 
those other organic living creatures whose animation and behaviour strikes us as 
consistent with it. 
Together with those other creatures, in our bodies-as-objects we proclaim that 
from a universe of cold, hard, material externalities there emerged at some stage of 
evolutionary complexity that extraordinary, intimate, felt interior reality that we call 
‘conscious being’ – namely ourselves (to take our own case from among perhaps 
uncountably many other cases) known from the inside. Extraordinary but also 
inalienable too: we have no choice in the matter – something chillingly explored in 
C.S. Lewis’s That Hideous Strength.58 Moreover it is conspicuous that we share a 
world with indefinitely many other kinds of creatures whose perception of that 
world is to some extent, and in some cases utterly, unlike our own. Confronting the 
fact that a moth’s world is not merely apprehended but actually constructed by its 
own peculiar perceptual apparatus should remind us that our world is equally 
constructed by our equally peculiar sensory complement. Yet since these are aspects 
of a shared reality then we are (arguably) a special but (certainly) not an exclusive 
case of experiencing beings. 
As well as experience, our bodies are also the ground of our agency. We 
purposively move, lift, crush, build, nurture, dissect, condemn, pursue, ingest, flee 
from and collaborate with a myriad things in the world around us including other 
examples of the sorts of things that we ourselves are. So, in their own way, do cats 
sharks, bees and weaver birds. They are unable to reflect as we can on the puzzle of 
willed action, but this does not mean that their actions are unintended or 
haphazard. For them no less than for us (albeit less vividly) their agency consists in 
actions known both externally by others and from the inside by themselves. 
A further curious aspect of our embodiment shared with the other animals is its 
finitude – we all wind down, inexorably, within remarkably reliable limits 
characteristic of each species. Biological finitude draws our attention to two 
existential puzzles. The first is that, although (I suggest) it is impossible to conceive of 
consciousness in wholly-material terms, it arises apparently without non-material 
antecedents. The second, and counterpart, is that when we die it apparently ceases 
without remainder – nothing is left that is knowable by either ourselves or others. 
That means that even in the course of reading these lines you inhabit a temporary 
spark that emerged from a prior blackness that was nothing to you, and that will be 
extinguished within a further blackness that will be nothing to you. Your continuity 
stretches in both directions from the rolling present, but in each direction it comes 
to a stop, beyond which it was and will be as though you had never been. (I have 
elsewhere tried to grapple with a miniature form of this shocking puzzle in 
contemplation of the idea of ‘experiectomy’ through memory-obliterating 
sedation.59) 
 
 
Special objects – but how special? 
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The position we have arrived at is this. We want to uphold a motivic concern of 
medical humanities, namely to redress biomedicine’s tendency to objectify patients 
where that tendency means insufficiently attending to their individuality and their 
experience. But we also want to avoid replacing one form of reductionism with 
another, in particular to avoid disregarding or downplaying the object-hood of the 
patient. One would not wish to deny that patients are also more-than-objects. But to 
regard medicine’s error as viewing the patient as a mere object is in a sense to 
compound that error: no object is a ‘mere’ object in the dismissive sense of that 
phrase! What we need is a view of patients that does justice to their personhood 
and their object-hood alike – and is capable of coping with (if we think it really needs 
coping with) the taint of dualism that this way of putting the matter enjoins. 
We humans are both buoyed, and bounded, by the experience of material 
creatures – creatures who as objects know ourselves from the inside as well as the 
outside (we can, after all, see the more distant parts of our own bodies quite as well 
as others can see them, and in precisely the same way), who have agency, but who 
also have non-negotiable beginnings and endings. Doubtless we are a special kind of 
animal; and that in turn makes us a special kind of object or thing. But how special? 
It seems to depend on what sort of a line one is moved to draw, and where one 
draws it. Let us briefly consider some possibilities. 
An obvious criterion for specialness might be rationality – much appealed to by 
those in medical ethics (John Harris is a prominent instance) who regard the capacity 
for autonomous rational choice as the chief marker of moral worth.60 By this 
criterion, we are pretty special; our shared experience is one that admits of the 
analysis of past actions, the conjecture of alternative possible future actions, and the 
capacity for reflective self-contemplation. Of course, it takes the operation of 
rationality to identify, and thus to value, the capacity for rationality. Even within 
medical ethics debates, what else follows from the specialness of rationality, and its 
inbound capacity to intend, is contested. Not all, for instance, think that moral worth 
(an evidently separate scale of specialness) is tied to rationality, either actual or 
potential, although within medical ethics debates this view is ordinarily held with 
regard to exceptional cases of particularly unfortunate human beings, and frequently 
by those holding human life in general to be special. It is the exceptions that trouble 
them rather than the broad attribution of specialness to humans, which they will 
tend to ground elsewhere in order to protect exceptional non-rational or pre-
rational cases (such as the unborn child). 
So another conceivable criterion for what makes us special is sacredness – here, 
the extent to which our general (human) form of life can be held to be sacred. The 
evident difficulties, both of defining ‘the sacred’ and of demonstrating and defending 
the claim that some stake for humanity within the territory of the sacred, limit the 
appeal of this way of drawing the line. 
If by contrast your criterion for specialness is a more generous approach to 
experience as such, a capacity for experience that is not stipulated under forms of 
rationality, then our specialness is shared with abundantly many other creatures 
going all the way back almost as far as the sponge.61 The material world obtains for 
itself what I can only call ‘an experiential inside,’ or a felt interior, very early on in 
evolutionary terms, and certainly a long way before you reach the capacity for 
rational choice. Drawing the line here encircles a very large class of experiencing 
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creatures of a myriad different kinds – kinds that are mutually unintelligible for the 
most part, but sharing a world that somehow supports them all and supports their 
irreducibly different experiences of it. 
Contrasted with the experiences of other creatures, our rationality is joined by – 
or is expressed through – a further possible criterion. This is agency. It arises from 
our capacity for purposive intentional action that is moreover considered, 
deliberated. How special is this? Other creatures act, and they have needs and goals, 
and their actions may be directed towards those goals: their actions may, in the 
philosophical sense of the term, have intentionality, which is directedness. Certainly, 
this makes it as true of other creatures as of ourselves that their agency is not the 
same thing as causation: agency has the element of intentionality that is obviously 
missing from causation. What sets ours apart seems to be the aspect of 
contemplative choice, deliberative reflection. But agency is in one important sense 
not wholly detached from causation. Agency in the existential sense is possible only 
because causation is possible in the material sense. 
 
Wonder recalled 
 
This fusion of causation and agency, world and purpose, will and flesh, is for us the 
mode of our experience, and notably the grounding condition – as it were the 
subject-matter – both of what we call health and of what we call illness. But I believe 
it is also an enduring provocation to our sense of wonder. So where we draw the line 
of ‘specialness’ is, I think, influenced by among other things our susceptibility to a 
sense of wonder, and reflects the things that we are disposed to find wonderful. 
At all events, drawing the line distinguishes some objects – perhaps, ourselves – 
as special among other objects: in all cases their – and our – materiality is a part of 
the manner of their (or our) being special. The role of wonder in critical medical 
humanities includes at least a clarion call to us to remain mindful of our materiality, 
our object-ness, our thing-hood. We are, to recall, things that experience themselves 
from the inside and outside alike, in sickness and in health; no critique of medical 
reductionism can be adequate that does not begin from this recognition of our 
materiality. 
In short, our materiality, agency and finitude legitimately provoke wonder, and 
recognising this is of enduring value particularly within longitudinal forms of clinical 
medical practice, where practitioners must somehow engage ‘the lives of others.’ 
 
 
The scope of the ‘reverse’ critique – and of wonder’s role in 
critical medical humanities 
 
The ‘reverse’ critique upholds the aim of a standard medical humanities critique 
(challenging biomedical neglect of the patient’s experience) while refusing the 
standard critique’s unwitting neglect of the patient’s materiality. Putting our own 
house in order is a worthwhile undertaking, but does the reverse critique matter 
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beyond medical humanities? In part this depends on whether medical humanities 
itself ‘matters beyond medical humanities’ – how big the house is, as it were, or less 
gnomically whether medical humanities’ business begins and ends with medical 
treatment. That would be to say the least a conservative view. An alternative and 
more ambitious view is that medical humanities concerns our broader 
understanding of what makes lives go well or ill, and thus a contextualised 
understanding of the varying scope and pertinence of different aspects (and 
conceptions) of medical interventions in our lives. In this case, then the ‘reverse’ 
critique also has a wider bearing, reminding us that our materiality – together with 
the wonder that it can inspire – illuminates the other aspects of our flourishing. I 
hold this broader view, and I have come to think that an openness to wonder leads 
us to reconsider our flourishing, makes our flourishing newly-present to us. 
Thus, I contend, an openness to wonder can play a critical role in ‘critical medical 
humanities.’ But does an openness to wonder, or the engagement of a sense of 
wonder, distinguish ‘critical’ from conventional medical humanities? The simple 
answer is ‘yes.’ If in conventional medical humanities wonder was confined to 
service as an ‘educational good’ in the nurturing of humanistic clinicians, then in 
critical medical humanities an openness to wonder animates our sense of the 
vibrancy of matter, including the matter that is ourselves – in and as our bodies – as 
patients, well or ill. This in turn allows us to be dissatisfied with simplistic opposition 
to medical reductionism, falling as it too-easily does into replacing this first error 
with a second – superficially more benign, but in the long run doing no more justice 
than the first, in the face of the wondrous complexity and mystery that is our 
embodied experience. 
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